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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Texas. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides that an accused shall have the right to counsel for
his defense in criminal prosecutions by the federal government.
It was settled in Powell v. Alabama1 that it is a violation of due
process of law for a State to deny counsel where a person is
charged with a capital offense. However, the Supreme Court of
the United States in Betts v. Brady2 laid down the rule that a State
is not required to appoint counsel in every criminal prosecution.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, the court said: ". . . in the
great majority of the States, it has been the considered judgment
of the people, their representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right essential to a fair
trial."' This rule has been followed in several Texas cases.'
In the recent Texas case of Parsons v. State5 the court held that
the defendant was not denied due process of law when counsel
was not appointed to represent him. The defendant was indicted,
tried and convicted of felony theft, and was sentenced to life
imprisonment under what is commonly called the Habitual Criminal Act.'
The defendant had been convicted of felonies, less than capital,
on four previous occasions, had represented himself on the trial,
had cross-examined the State's witnesses, and had testified in his
own behalf. The court held that a failure to appoint counsel to
represent a defendant on trial for theft, wherein defendant received a life sentence as an habitual criminal, did not constitute
1287 U. S. 45 (1932).
2 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
8 Id. at 471.
4 Thomas v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. Rep. 549, 106 S. W. 2d. 289 (1937) ; Faggett v.
State, 122 Tex. Crim. Rep. 399, 55 S. W. 2d. 842 (1933); Lopez v. State, 46 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 473, 80 S. W. 1016 (1904).
.Tex. Crim. Rep.-,
218 S. W. 2d. 202 (1949).
xTm.
Pr.. CODE (Vernon, 1948) art. 63.
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a denial of due process of law where the defendant was 47 years
old at the time of the trial and experienced in criminal procedure.
The decision appears to be in line with the principle that it is
not necessary to appoint counsel in every criminal prosecution."
There are exceptions to this principle which do require counsel to
be appointed in a non-capital case as well as in a capital case to
8
provide due process of law.
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that a defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel for his defense,
though charged with a non-capital offense, in the following cases?
1. where the defendant was an inexperienced youth of 18, although familiar with criminal procedure, having been convicted
of earlier offenses; 10 2. where the defendant was unable to comprehend the consequences of his plea of guilty;" and 3. where
the defendant was an ignorant Indian and the case involved a difficult jurisdictional problem which an ordinary layman could not
comprehend. 2
One may safely conclude that the appointment of counsel is not
absolutely necessary where a defendant is charged with a noncapital offense but under certain circumstances appointment is necessary to afford due process. The circumstances which require that
counsel be appointed appear to be based upon the facts of the
individual case:
"[T]hat which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental
fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations fall short of such
denial.""3
7Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
8U. S. CosT. AMEND. XIV: ".. .nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."

9 Boles, Constitutional Law, 3 Southwestern L.J. 287, 311 (1949).
10 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672 (1948).
11 Uveges v. Pa., 335 U. S. 437 (1948).
12Rice v. Olsen, 324 U. S. 786 (1945).
is Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 462 (1942).
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Generally, the rule that counsel need not be appointed in all
criminal prosecutions applies only to States, since the Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel where the defendant
is charged with a federal offense.
RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY; EXCLUSION OF NEGROES

Oklahoma. It may be said that exclusion of Negroes from
jury service solely on account of their race or color denies a
Negro charged with crime equal protection and due process of
law, contrary to the Constitution of the United States.14 This
principle has been enforced in both Texas" and Oklahoma.'"
In Dixon v. State,"7 a recent Oklahoma case, the defendant, a
Negro citizen of Texas, was tried and convicted of the felony of
assault with a deadly weapon. The court held that defendant was
not denied due process or equal protection. Defendant was arrested for drinking liquor in a public place, and while being
searched, he shot a deputy sheriff. Defendant moved to quash
the panel of jurors on the ground that no Negroes had been called
for jury service, thus depriving him of due process and equal
protection.
The holding does not appear to violate the principle that a
Negro has been denied due process where there has been an
exclusion of Negroes from the jury. Where a Negro or other person seeks to quash a panel of jurors on the ground that he is
being discriminated against, he has the burden of proving discrimination. 8 This is the distinguishing point of the present case.
The court overruled the defendant's motion to quash the panel on
the ground that he failed to prove discrimination. It was recognized
that if he had shown the alleged discrimination, in that Negroes
were excluded from jury service solely on the basis of their race
or color, he would have been entitled to quash the panel.
14

U. S. CO ST. AMEND. XIV; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935).

15 Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316 (1906) ; Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900).
16 Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935).
IT ---Okla.
, 206 P. 2d. 231 (1949).
18 Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935).

